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Subjective experience at any instant consists of a single (‘unitary’), coherent interpretation
of sense data rather than a ‘Bayesian blur’ of alternatives. However, computation of Bayes-
optimal actions has no role for unitary perception, instead being required to integrate over
every possible action-percept pair to maximise expected utility. So what is the role of unitary
coherent percepts, and how are they computed? Recent work provided objective evidence for
non-Bayes-optimal, unitary coherent, perception and action in humans; and further suggested
that the percept selected is not the maximum a posteriori (MAP) percept but is instead
affected by utility. The present study uses a binocular fusion task first to reproduce the same
effect in a new domain, and second, to test multiple hypotheses about exactly how utility
may affect the percept. After accounting for high experimental noise, it finds that both
Bayes optimality (MEU) and the previously proposed maximum-utility (MU) hypothesis are
outperformed in fitting the data by a modified maximum-salience (MS) hypothesis, using
unsigned utility magnitudes in place of signed utilities in the bias function.
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1. Introduction
Our experience of the world is ‘unitary coherent’. Unitary means we only perceive one
interpretation at a time (e.g. either a face or a vase in the Rubin Vase illusion) rather
than a blur of multiple possible interpretations (never the face and vase together). Co-
herent means that we almost always perceive scenes comprised of parts which do not
contradict one another (e.g we do not see part face and part vase). While perception’s
unitary coherent (UC) nature may seem prima facie obvious from subjective experience,
such experience is notoriously unreliable and ill-defined (No, Pessoa, & Thompson, 2000).
Further, UC perception is not required at all by optimal decision making, which must
consider all possible interpretations of sensory data (Bernardo & Smith, 2000) to maxi-
mize expected utility (MEU strategy), without reference to any single privileged unitary
state,
aMEU = argamax
∫
s
U(a, s)P (s|d)ds, (1)
where d is sensory data, s are states, U is utility and a are actions. 1 So what are our
UC percepts for? MEU inference is generally NP-hard (Cooper, 1990) and so unitary
coherent perception seems likely to be involved in some approximation to optimal action
selection. What kind of approximation is this? In machine perception, such as machine
1Sampling approximations to MEU ignore some improbable interpretations (Spiegelhalter, Thomas, Best, & Gilks,
2008), but still sum over multiple samples of possible world states s rather than privileging any particular unitary
state.
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vision (Felzenszwalb & Huttenlocher, 2005) or speech recognition (Young et al., 2006),
the unitary coherent maximum a posteriori (MAP) state is often reported as final output,
sMAP = argsmaxP (s|d). (2)
However agents usually have percepts to help make actions rather than for their own
sake. In these cases, perceiving the MAP state does not necessarily lead to the best
action if the following MAP strategy is used,
aMAP = argamaxU(a, sMAP ). (3)
A recent study (Fox & Stafford, 2012) provided objective evidence of the existence
of UC perception, removing the need for reference to ‘subjective experience’ in the UC
debate. It further proposed a particular form of UC perception and action, differing from
both MEU action and MAP action, called maximum utility perception (MU). In MU a
UC state and action are chosen together,
(sMU , aMU ) = args,amaxU(a, s)P (s|d). (4)
For example, suppose you see your neighbour, whose state (s) may be happy or sad. This
state is not observable directly but data (d) from his facial expression gives uncertain
evidence about it. Approaching the neighbour to start a conversation, avoiding him, or
hedging by just saying hello, are three possible actions (a), and you may assign estimates
of the utility (U) of each action in each state as in Table 1. MEU, MAP and MU will
each choose different actions under these utilities due to their differences in maximizing
or integrating over the possible states.
Fox & Stafford (2012) used the ambiguous states (s) of a Necker cube image (d) to
produce multiple perceptual possibilities and showed MU actions gave higher utility than
MAP actions, and were a better fit to human actions than either MEU or MAP actions.
However the experiment left open the possibilities that the effect might be specific to
Necker cube percepts and that further action selection strategies could fit the data even
better than MU.
The present study seeks to address these issues by using a different type of visual
ambiguity – binocular fusion (Maier, Panagiotaropoulos, Tsuchiya, & Keliris, 2012)2.
Corroborative evidence of UC perception and action in this new visual task, when taken
together with the previous study (Fox & Stafford, 2012), would suggest its generality
across many visual tasks. The binocular task has a simpler action space than the Necker
cube task to allow more precise noise modelling, and is further designed to be able to
differentiate between the MU form of UC and a new related hypothesis – maximum
salience – by including negative utilities.
It is important that as in (Fox & Stafford, 2012), findings concern only the ‘everyday’
system of immediate perception and action: of perception of complex objects on the scale
of fractions of seconds, such as glancing at a new scene. In contrast it is well-known that
MEU-like behaviour occurs both for simpler, stimulus-response type tasks on shorter
times scales in specific environments (Ko¨rding & Wolpert, 2004); and also in complex
percept-action on longer timescales, during which multiple stable percepts and actions
can be perceived and deliberated over sequentially (Griffiths, Chater, Kemp, Perfors, &
2Binocular ‘rivalry’ is a special case in which a UC percept is seen that matches one of the eye inputs exactly.
Pre-supposing the presence of rivalry would not allow MEU to be tested, so the more general term ‘fusion’ is used
throughout this paper.
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Tenenbaum, 2010; Chater, Tenenbaum, & Yuille, 2006; Lepora et al., 2012; Eisenfhr,
Weber, & Langer, 2010). The present study does not dispute the existence of these other
systems but corroborates the existence of an additional system as in (Fox & Stafford,
2012; Lengyel & Dayan, 2008). Similar findings were reported in an fMRI study (Fleming,
Whiteley, Hulme, Sahani, & Dolan, 2010) but without explanation via specific strategy
models such as MU and MS. As in (Fox & Stafford, 2012) and psychophysics in general,
experimental noise is very high due to the need of very brief stimuli. New noise models
are used to analyze this, requiring fewer assumptions that the method of (Fox & Stafford,
2012).
2. Varieties of UC perception and action
MAP and MU are not the only possible types of UC perception, and we may consider
a new, generalized class of strategies which replace the utility term of eqn. 4 with other
bias functions B(a, s) of action and state:
(sMB, aMB) = args,amaxB(a, s)P (s|d). (5)
The simplest B(a, s) = 1 gives the MAP strategy. B(a, s) = U(a, s) gives the MU
strategy. Choosing instead B(s) = |U(a, s)| we may define a new maximum saliency, MS
strategy,
(sMS , aMS) = args,amax |U(a, s)|P (s|d). (6)
This might be more useful than MU in cases where negative utilities are present. For
example, consider deciding to reach for an object which may be a sleeping predator or
prey with equal probability. MAP would perceive one percept, either predator or prey
with a 50% chance each. MU would perceive prey, because it is part of the best-case
scenario. But MS is more prudent, seeing the predator, as the large negative utility
from waking it and being eaten is more salient than the positive utility of reducing our
hunger. Negative utilities were not present in the previous study (Fox & Stafford, 2012)
so it was unable to distinguish between MU and MS: they give identical predictions in
tasks where all utilities are positive. By introducing negative utilities in the present study
we can newly discriminate between MU and MS. The present study tests for MS against
MAP, MEU and MU in a controlled environment to determine which best resembles
observed human actions. No experiment can measure human perceptions directly, but by
measuring actions we can make inferences about the accompanying content of perception
within these hypotheses.
3. Methods
Overview. The present study uses controlled stimuli and forced-choice actions in an arti-
ficial binocular fusion task to simplify presentation and analysis. The four hypotheses to
be tested against one another are MAP, MEU, MU and MS as in equations 2,3,4 and 6.
Data, d, are image pixels, states are s ∈ {happy, sad} of faces generating the pixels, and
actions, a, are button presses. A system of training and examination introduced by (Fox
& Stafford, 2012) is used to guarantee that subjects understand the utility function and
that their use of it is close to optimal, before collecting data.
3
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(a) unmasked happy and sad faces. (b) full-masked stimu-
lus.
(c) half-masked happy and sad.
Figure 1. Three types of stimulus used in the experiment.
Figure 2. Trial structure. A stereo pair is presented, then blanked, then the user’s choice is recorded.
Figure 3. Structure of whole study, only data from boxed/underlined trials are analysed. Blacked-out mouth=full
mask; pixellated mouth=half-masked. The three stages proceed sequentially: calibration, training and examination,
then data collection. Training and examination is repeated until the examination is passed.
4
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Stimuli. Stimuli used in all experiments were pairs of faces, as in fig. 1, which may be
unmasked, half-masked or full-masked. The faces in the pair may be the same or different
states (‘rivalrous’) but always have the same degree of masking. Full masking is a low-
resolution pixellation of the mouth makes the happy/sad state completely unknown; half-
masking is a higher resolution pixellation which makes it visible with some visual effort,
typically a few seconds of full attention to become certain of the happy or sad mouth
direction. Binocular rivalry is well-known to lead to reports of subjective experiences
of seeing one face or the other.3 Subjects viewed the stimuli via a pair of dichoptic
displays from 70cm through red-green anaglyphic glasses, seeing one face in each eye.
Two faces of neutral gender generated by Facegen Modeller (www.facegen.com) were
used to generate the stimuli (fig. 2(a)). Stimuli were presented against a uniform gray
background using the MATLAB Psychophysics Toolbox (www.psychtoolbox.org) on an
LCD monitor (1024× 768 pixels, 60Hz).
Trials. A trial means one presentation of a face pair and the collection of one button
press from the subject. Fig. 2 shows the process for a trial. A fixation cross (0.5◦× 0.5◦)
was presented to each eye. Test images subtend 12◦×8.5◦ visual angle. Distance from the
fixation cross to the mouse of the face stimulus was constantly 4.5◦ visual angle. Subjects
were instructed to stare at the fixation cross constantly. Face pairs are presented to left
and right eye simultaneously, centred on the cross, for 200ms, followed by a maximum
2000ms blank screen, during which subjects made a decision to press a button according
to their latest instructions. After a button press, the program waited for another 1000ms
then the next trail begun.
Subjects. 23 subjects were recruited, all college students in the Department of Psychol-
ogy, University of Sheffield. Ages ranged 18-28 years except one 50 year old female, all
with normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Calibration. To simplify the analysis, we would like all rivalrous stimuli to have P (s) =
0.5 for both of the coherent states s ∈ {happy, sad}. To achieve this, stimuli were adjusted
per subject so that in the absence of any utility bias, each subject perceived roughly equal
numbers of happy and sad faces when confronted with half-masked rivalrous pairs. An
iterative process tailored the stimuli to achieve this by countering biases due to eye
dominance, color dominance, or emotional preference. Calibration trails used conflicting
pairs of happy and sad faces only, and subjects reported their percepts directly via
two buttons marked HAPPY and SAD. Images were adjusted until approximately half
each of happy and sad faces were reported. We calibrated both for any possible eye
dominance and for emotional preference. An annealed gradient descent algorithm was
used to adjust image parameters. Calibration contained 16 blocks, each block contained
10 trials, comprising 5 ‘left happy / right sad’ trials and 5 ‘right happy / left sad’ trials.
During each block, if information on one eye had more dominant influence on subject’s
choice, the image contrast on this eye would be impaired. Similarly, if a subject saw
one emotion (happy or sad) more frequently, the image contrast on this emotion would
be impaired. The adjustable parameters were: eye bias DB and emotional bias EB.
Another 2 parameters C1 and C2 are used to record subject’s behaviour in one block of
the calibration. C1 record the 5 left happy right sad trials. In each LHRS trial, if subject
recognised the contradictory visual stimuli as an unitary coherent happy face, subject
would choose ‘happy’ and C1=C1+1; if subject see unitary coherent sad face, he/she
would choose ‘sad’ and C1=C1-1; if subject see neutral or contradictory or uncertain
3We make no use of potentially unreliable subjective reports, only of directly observed, utility-driven actions.
Percepts can then be inferred from the actions under the various models being tested. If subjects had difficulty
seeing the mouth direction in half-masks, the degree of masking was adjusted to make it just possible for them at
the start of the experiment, before calibration.
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Percept/action APPROACH HELLO AVOID
:-) 10 1 -4
:-( -20 1 3
Average -5 1 -0.5
Table 1. Payoff matrix used in action-report experiment.
about the emotion, he/she would choose ‘uncertain’ and C1 stays the same. C2 record
the same in right happy left sad trials (RHLS trials). The following annealed gradient
descent updates where N is the number of the trial within the block,
△DB = e
C1−C2
3N ,△EB = e
C1+C2
3N . (7)
Training and examination. After calibration, subjects are provided with three new
buttons and given the following text:
Every day your neighbour is in his garden. Sometimes he is in a good mood and some-
times a bad mood. If he is in a good mood then it is good to start a conversation with
him (press TALK button). If he is in a bad mood it is best to avoid him (press AVOID
button). Or you can just say hello (press HELLO button), this is quite good if he is in a
good mood but not too bad if he is in a bad mood.
The scoring system for percept-action pairs in table 1, was carefully designed to dis-
criminate between our different hypotheses, such that the different strategies under con-
sideration lead to different actions for rivalrous percepts. As in (Fox & Stafford, 2012)
subjects were required train then pass an ‘examination’ to prove they have fully internal-
ized this scoring system. In training blocks of 30 trials, stimuli on left eye and right eye
are the same. 10 are half-masked happy faces, 10 are half-masked sad faces and 10 are
full masked random faces.4 Scores for each trial are printed on the screen immediately
after each action. Each training round has two blocks, score maximization and score min-
imisation, where subjects were asked by the experimenter to obtain highest and lowest
scores possible. Subjects perform repeated training rounds until they achieve threshold
scores of 98 in maximisation and negative 200 (-200) in minimisation. These thresholds
are set such that they can only be achieved by doing the optimal action in every trial.
Therefore we can be certain that any subject passing this ‘examination’ understands,
and can act optimally using, the scoring system. Importantly this includes use of the
hedging HELLO action when faced with the rivalrous full-masked stimuli. (All subjects
passed the exam eventually).
Data collection. Following successful completion of the exam, subjects were presented
with a further 42 similar trials. The buttons and scoring were identical to the training
rounds. However subjects are asked only to maximise their total score, and the face
pairs used are different. Here we use the following image pairs: (happy,happy), (sad,sad),
(happy,sad), (sad,happy), (full-mask, full-mask), where happy and sad are half-masked.
Only the 24 rivalrous pairs are required in this paper’s analysis, the other 18 may be
considered as distractors.5
4Half-masking was used here because in pilot experiments, subjects trained on unmasked tasks tended to notice
something was different in the data collection phase and perhaps realise that a ‘trick’ is being played on them by
the experimenter, but half-masking was found to remove this effect because it accustoms subjects to the presence
of noise in general.
5Criticism of the experimental logic might argue that the training and experiment tasks are different, because
‘bait and switch’ is applied to the stimuli between them, and that subjects have therefore been trained to rely on
a unimodal distribution and are unfairly switched to a task relying on a bimodal one. However this is precisely
the point of the experiment. The underlying probabilistic model required to solve the tasks does not change, only
6
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(a) single faces with impaired happy and sad
emotion.
(b) neutral emotion.
(c) One of many exam-
ples that subjective ex-
perience of half happy
and half sad.
(d) The example of
subjective experience of
contradictory face with
smiling and sad mouth
overlapping each other.
Figure 4. Mockups of reconstructed unitary coherent subjective perception after binocular fusion
Debriefing. Subjects were asked for informal reports of their subjective experiences at
the end of the whole experiment.
A summary of the trial types used in the experimental stages is shown in fig. 3.
4. Results
Debriefing. Binocular rivalry is sometimes assumed to be a perfect form of perceptual
ambiguity, however subjects did report experiences of other types of fusion than rivalry,
disclosed here: sometimes a less-happy or less-sad face, see fig. 4;(a); sometimes a neutral
face, see fig.4(b); sometimes a reconstruction into other combinations of happy and sad
faces, see fig.4(c); in very rare cases, subjects might see a unitary but non-coherent face,
see fig.4(d). This was reported by 3 of 23 subjects. Reports of ‘no percept’ were common
due to the short presentation time (shorter than in the examination). Also the long data
collection period may have induced boredom in some subjects leading to giving up on
the task and to completely random actions. All subjects were found naive to the purpose
of the study, and unaware of binocular fusion theory.
Testing hypotheses against the data must take account of experimental noise. This
is because for each of the pure hypotheses, there is at least one action it would never
make, but the results do contains mixtures of all the actions. From debriefing it was
clear that some stimuli were not perceived at all or perceived in ways not included in
the shape of the distribution over this model. The fact that unimodal distributions can be used is sufficient to
accept the existence of UC perception in at least these tasks.
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TALK                             HELLO                               AVOID
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
P
MAP (best loglik=-606.41, theta=0.97
(a) MAP
TALK                             HELLO                               AVOID
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
P
MEU (best loglik=-606.49, theta=1.00
(b) MEU
TALK                             HELLO                               AVOID
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
P
MU (best loglik=-606.49, theta=1.00
(c) MU
TALK                             HELLO                               AVOID
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
P
MS (best loglik=-594.28, theta=0.85
(d) MS
Figure 5. Fitting four hypotheses to the Action Report task: MAP, MEU, MU and MS. Observed responses from
552 trials are plotted as gray bars, as beta posteriors of their generators with 1 standard deviation bars. Each
hypothesis has one free parameter, θ. Choosing a value of θ specifies a model with the hypothesis. Dotted lines
show models with P (noise) = 10%:10%:100%; dashes show the noiseless model θ = 0. The best fitting θ model
within each hypothesis is shown by a bold line; its value and log likelihood are above the graph. All models are
discrete, each describing only three numerical probabilities over the three actions as shown by the diamonds – the
continuous dotted, dashed, and thick lines are used only to indicate which predictions come from which model.
the hypotheses. Such experimental noise is very common in forced-choice psychophysics
experiments, and is easily accounted for.
We therefore consider each hypothesis (h ∈ MAP,MEU,MU,MS) to be set of models,
{h(θ)}θ, having continuous values of a free parameter θ. The meaning of θ = P (noise) is
the probability that a trial’s action is a random button press rather than the optimal ac-
tion ah of the hypothesis. For each model in a hypothesis’ set, the likelihood P (data|h(θ))
can be computed by
P (data|h(θ)) =
∏
a
P (a|h(θ))|a|, (8)
where |a| is the number of trials in which action a was taken in the observed data. We
consider the set of all rivalrous trials as data, other trials are distractors. Making minimal
assumptions, a flat prior is taken over hypotheses and noise values.
Response prediction from a selection of these models are shown in fig. 5. Dotted lines
show predictions using ten values of θ from 10% to 100% in steps of 10%. The pure,
8
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θ = 0 model shown by the dashed line: for MEU, MU and MS these predict different
single actions, and for MAP predict a mix of two actions. For each hypothesis, the
optimal θ is found by numeric search. Its value and corresponding log likelihood – the
best log likelihood for the hypothesis whole model set – is shown above the graph, and
its prediction as a thick line.
We seek the single best model from the four hypotheses’ combined sets of models.
To find it, it suffices to find the best-fitting models within each of the four hypothe-
ses, according to their log-likelihoods, then compare these four best models against one
another. It can be seen from the log-likelihoods in fig. 5 that the overall best model is
MS(θ = 0.85). This has a log-likelihood of 12.2 greater than any of the other hypotheses’
models, so is e12.2 ≈ 200, 000 times more likely than any of them.
In addition to the four models under test, we considered two further models which may
help to reduce or give insight into the noise levels and alternative future model classes.
Perfect two-parameter model. The four models tested each have one free parameter, θ,
and we note that as there are only three possible actions, a perfect fit can be made by a
two-parameter model (2PM) which simply assigns frequentist probabilities to two actions
P (TALK) and P (HELLO) according to their observed counts, and thus P (AV OID) =
1− P (TALK)− P (HELLO). This model is obviously over-fitted to the data, but may
be analyzed using Bayesian Information Criteria scores, BIC = −2 lnL + k lnn. The
log likelihood lnL of 2PM on the data was found to be -585.71, compared with -594.28
for the MS model, a difference of 5.13 in favour of 2PM. BIC with n = 552 data points
and k free parameters yields penalty terms (Occam factors) of 1 × ln 552 = 6.3 and
2 × 6.3 = 12.4 respectively. This implies that the best possible two parameter model,
and thus any two parameter model – such as any weighted mixture of strategies – has a
worse BIC score than MS so can make no claim to be a better model than MS. However
the BIC difference is not significant so this does not rule out two parameter models, it
only shows they are not better than MS. For now we argue that MAP,MEU,MU and
MS should have higher subjective priors because they are theory-driven rather than just
fitted to data, and we exclude 2PM for this reason, but future larger data could resolve
this without the need for subjective experimenter assumptions.
Per-subject model. The present study was not intended to explore per-subject effects,
and the data sizes were selected to obtain significant population results at minimal finan-
cial experiment cost. However we can examine what, if any, power the present data has
to inform per-subject models. While we cannot test every possible per-subject model, a
reasonable model might be a Per Subject Switching (PSS) model which assigns to each
subject the best fitting choice of MAP,MEU,MU or MS. In particular this would sepa-
rate out the effects of some bored subjects abandoning the task from less noisy subjects.
Assigning one indicator variable to each of 23 subjects, and assuming a single free noise
parameter θ shared over all of MAP,MEU,MU and MS, gives gives k = 24. Optimizing
over θ, the best log likelihood of PSS on the data was found to be -508.87 (at θ = 0.50),
a difference of 85.4 in favour of PSS over MS. However as with 2PM, this gain is out-
weighed by a large penalty term k lnn = 151 which makes MS very strongly better than
PSS. It remains possible that with larger data, per-subject effects may be resolvable, but
the present data is not able, or intended, to do this.
5. Discussion
The maximum likelihood model is MS with a θ = 0.85, i.e. most (85%) of trails in
the test phase are responded by a random action. Importantly – the clearly significant
9
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victory of MS (200,000 more likely than its competitors) in the hypothesis contest is
obtained despite this very high experimental noise level. This is possible because of the
large number (N = 552) of trials conducted – a large number of very noisy trials give
rise to a non-noisy, significant finding. The noise level was higher than expected during
the experimental design, and possible causes include the absence of any percept at all
due to the short (200ms) presentation time; bored subjects acting randomly to reach
the end of the long experiment without regard for winning the small prize; and the
occasional incoherent percepts reported during debriefing. These are all similar issues to
the noise sources in (Fox & Stafford, 2012): unitary coherent perception is very difficult
to isolate experimentally, because as is common in forced-choice psychophysics, too short
a presentation results in no perception and random action, whilst too long a presentation
allows time for other forms of cognition to occur. Psychophysics is famously difficult for
this reason, and it remains a challenge to design more precise experiments to reduce the
noise. High noise is expected because each presentation is short and barely perceivable,
in order to avoid subjects seeing multiple interpretations in sequence, and so as in forced-
choice blindsight experiments we expect each trial to be noisy but the aggregate of many
trials to obtain significance. We stress that despite the high noise, we have still shown
MS to be 200,000 times more likely than the other hypotheses because the large data set
compensates for the per-trial noise.
As in any data modelling study, the possibility remains of newer, alternative hypothesis
better fitting the data, than any of those tested so far. However, our hypothesis set
includes the two most popular views of perception and action – MAP and MEU – which
are not straw men. And they are clearly falsified in the study’s domain by the success
of MS. This does not mean that MS is ‘true’, just that it is a better model that was
previously available. (This is standard Bayesian logic as detailed in (Jaynes & Bretthorst,
2003)). The contribution of this paper is in falsifying both MEU and MU for the face task,
by proposing a new best hypothesis MS which beats them. Any future invention of new
models giving even better fits than MS would be additional scientific progress – just as
the present study refines and replaces the previous MU model of (Fox & Stafford, 2012)
with MS. Future models might include mixtures of the current models. For example,
new models might be completely non-probabilistic, or not involve assumptions about the
existence of any mental representation of s. Or mixtures of strategies might occur within
or between subjects. Mixtures made only of the hypotheses tested in the present study
must still have MS as the strongest component because it has been shown to fit the data
better than the others. Mixtures and other complex models will incur high Occam factor
penalties for any extra parameters, and while the present study does not rule them out, it
suggests that larger data sets would be needed to resolve competitions of mixture models
against MS as the present data was not designed to test them.
The victory of MS in the present hypotheses contest is in agreement with the Necker
cube study of (Fox & Stafford, 2012), fMRI work of (Fleming et al., 2010), and the
unitary coherent hippocampal perception model of (Fox & Prescott, 2010). Together
these findings suggest the existence of unitary coherent perception and action based upon
it in more general domains. Given the current available hypothesis set, we have shown
as in (Fleming et al., 2010), (Mulder, Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, Boekel, & Forstmann,
2012) that utilities of available actions can affect what you see in a new domain, and
refined a novel, quantitative MS explanation which advances from the previous MU
explanation. Utility biases unitary coherent perception, as is immediately clear from the
difference between observed TALK and AVOID frequencies (recalling that calibration
set the corresponding utility-neutral frequencies to be equal). The particular form of this
bias now appears to be Maximum Salience – exactly as in Orwell’s story ‘1984’, whose
10
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hero not only reports but actually sees five fingers instead of four to avoid pain.
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